Trade Dress, the "Likelihood of Confusion," and
Wittgenstein's Discussion of "Seeing As":
The Tangled Landscape of Resemblance
Stephen C. Root'
Two faces which resemble each other, make us laugh, when together, by
their resemblance, though neither of them by itself makes us laugh.
-Blaise Pascal'
We find certain things about seeing puzzling because we do notfind the
whole business of seeing puzzling enough.
-Ludwig Wittgenstein'
INTRODUCTION

How is it that one object may so resemble another that it is likely
to be confused with the other? After all, when reflected upon, it
emerges as a deeply puzzling-albeit commonplace-fact that at
times objects appear to resemble one another to such a degree that
confusion is likely between the two; and such confusion develops
even though each of the objects remains clearly distinct from, and is
by no means transformed into, the other. Whether there is such a
degree of resemblance between objects that a "likelihood of
confusion" exists, however, is an issue that must be answered-often
with significant consequences, financial and otherwise-in cases
involving claims of infringement of trade dress, the intellectual
property doctrine that permits the ownership of the particular "look"
of a product or service.3 Judges and juries routinely determine the
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8:1, at 8-2 (4th ed. 1998) (noting the nature of trade dress protection). For a
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existence of actually or potentially confusing resemblance between
looks in trade dress infringement disputes. The tests for determining
the presence of such resemblance are commonplace in the decisions
and literature discussing trade dress. However, the basis upon which
resemblance is perceived, much less the basis upon which
resemblance is determined to create a likelihood of confusion
between two objects, is neither easy to determine nor to articulate.
Federal courts generally have required the presence of three
elements to find infringement of trade dress. Those three elements
are (1) that the trade dress in question be either inherently
distinctive or have acquired a secondary meaning," (2) that the trade

dress in question be nonfunctional,5 and (3) that there be a
"likelihood of confusion" between the trade dress in question and
that of another product or service.6 The difficulty of determining a
likelihood of confusion is evident in the multipartite tests developed
to identify the presence of a likelihood of confusion and in the
routine expressions of caution and/or dissatisfaction by the courts
applying those tests.7 Making a distinctly unorthodox use of the
provocative discussion of the growth of protection that trade dress provides, claiming
that such growth threatens to usurp the role of other intellectual property doctrines,
see generally Tom W. Bell, Virtual TradeDress: A Very Real Problem, 56 MD. L REv. 384
(1997).
4 For a discussion of the definition of "secondary meaning,"
see infra note 24
and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the meaning of "nonfunctional," see infra notes 25 and 26
and accompanying text.
See infra note 21 (noting several of the cases that apply the tripartite test).
Because the focus of this Article is the difficulty of providing a conceptual basis
upon which to develop a coherent test for the presence of a likelihood of confusion,
I shall not linger over what is meant by the phrase "likelihood of confusion" itself.
However, one commentator has provided the following helpful gloss:
The phrase "likely to cause confusion" may be parsed as follows:
Likely means probable; it is irrelevant that confusion is
"possible." In requiring proof of a "substantial likelihood of
confusion," one court said that "[t]his is more than mere
semantics" and declined "to speculate as to any imaginable
confusion . . . ." Where there is no possibility of confusion,
there is of course no likelihood of confusion.
To Cause The accused infringer's mark must be the legal
cause and cause in fact of confusion.
Confusion, as one court defined it simply by quoting the
dictionary, is "an act of mistaking one thing for another, of
failing to note distinctions, and of falsely identifying." The court
noted that the full statutory element ("likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive") "parallels this definition in
the context of trademark infringement."
RicHARD L. KIRKPATRICK,
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 1.1
(Practicing Law Institute 1997) (citations omitted).
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philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of the human ability to
see aspects of objects,8 this Article explores the conceptual
"landscape" 9 underlying the multifactor tests used to determine the
likelihood of confusion.
This Article argues that due to the
irreducibly complex conceptual nature of the phenomena they seek
to identify, such tests are fraught with difficulties and complications
that everyday practice to some degree masks, but cannot resolve.
This Article is divided into four sections. Part I briefly outlines
the nature of trade dress protection and aspects of the evolution of
trade dress doctrine in order to provide a context for the Article as a
whole.
Part II catalogues the approaches federal courts have taken in
determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion by surveying
the tests for such confusion employed by the federal circuits. This
Article will note that, although these tests represent pragmatic
attempts to deal with the puzzling and problematic nature of
determining the existence and degree of resemblance, the tests
8

Although the use to which it is put for this study is decidedly unorthodox,

Wittgenstein's thought has been employed in a variety of jurisprudential contexts,
often in connection with discussions of what might be termed legal hermeneutics.
See generally Stanley Cavell, What's the Use of CallingEmerson a Pragmatist, 18 CARDOZO
L. REv. 171 (1996) (considering the characterization of Wittgenstein as a "neopragmatist"); Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEvs. J. 289 (1994) (contrasting Wittgenstein's approach
to language with that of the adherents of the "plain meaning" rule); David Luban,
What's PragmaticAbout Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 43 (1996) (exploring
the theoretical grounding of legal pragmatism); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering
the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L REv. 781 (1989) (utilizing Wittgenstein's claim that a lack
of controversy indicates the presence of rules to argue for the existence of the "rule
of law"); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463 (1992)
(using Wittgenstein's discussion of expressions and "mental states" to explore the
status of mental states); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REv. 321
(1995) (discussing the role of Wittgenstein's thought in legal hermeneutics);Jeremy
Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some PhilosophicalIssues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509
(1994) (using Wittgenstein's analyses to explore philosophical notions of vagueness
and ambiguity); see also Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law,
72 CAL. L. REv. 753, 763-64 (1984) (using Wittgenstein's analysis of "family
resemblance" to elucidate the complexity of the term "religion").
9 The use of the evocative term "landscape" to describe
the contour of concepts
and relations between concepts involved in a particular area of thought is
Wittgenstein's own, appearing on the initial page of Wittgenstein's preface, which is
the first page of the PhilosophicalInvestigations. After noting that the nature of his
philosophic enterprise resulted in a discussion that could not be organized in a more
traditional and systematic manner, Wittgenstein states: "The philosophical remarks
in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in
the course of these long and involvedjourneyings." WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at v.
Wittgenstein's richly suggestive use of the word "landscape" dictates its repeated use
in this Article.
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remain-as is routinely noted by the very courts applying themcontingent, unwieldy, often incomplete, and, in many ways, generally
unsatisfactory.
Part III makes an idiosyncratic use of the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as"-the ability to perceive
aspects of the objects of perception, such as resemblance-in his
Philosophical Investigations in order to investigate the difficulties
inherent in any attempt to subject to conceptual analysis the human
ability to perceive resemblance."
Wittgenstein's complex
investigation of the concepts involved in the human ability to
perceive aspects of objects of perception reveals a conceptual
landscape that is so anfractuous and puzzling that it resists
comprehensive conceptualization.
This Article finally concludes that, due to ineradicable
conceptual multiplicity, interrelation, and complexity disclosed by
Wittgenstein's discussion, the tests for likelihood of confusion that
courts employ in adjudicating trade dress disputes must necessarily
remain contingent, incomplete, and, to some significant degree,
unsatisfactory.
I. "LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION" AND TRADE DRESS DOCTRINE

"Trade dress" is defined as the total impression a product or
service creates in the mind of a consumer by such elements as design,
decoration, shape, color, texture, graphics, and other perceptible
qualities." As one leading commentator describes the concept:
Traditionally, "trade dress" was thought to consist only of the
10 The purpose of this Article is to utilize Wittgenstein's philosophical approach

and certain of its results for purposes of elucidating, at a fundamental level, the
conceptual basis for developing a test for the presence of a likelihood of confusion in
the context of trade dress. As a result, it is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate
Wittgenstein's philosophical enterprise as a whole. It should be noted, however, that
profound and far-reaching critiques of Wittgenstein's thought, in particular, and of
the attempts by analytical philosophy, in general, to resolve preconceptual
experiences (e.g., intuition) into conceptual structures have been made. For the
former, see STANLEY ROSEN, NIHIUSM: A PILOSOPHIcAL ESSAY 1-55, 140-235 (1969);
for the latter, see STANLEY ROSEN, THE LIMITS OF ANALYSLs 3-26, 129-48, 175-89 (1980)
[hereinafter ROSEN, THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS].
n See Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1997). The court noted:
"Trade dress has been defined as 'the design and appearance of (a] product
together with all the elements making up the overall image that serves to identify the
product presented to the consumer.'" Id. (quoting Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v.
Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997)). For the distinction between
trade dress and trademarks, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3,§ 8:1, at 8-4 to 8-6. Trade
dress is concerned with the totality of the impression created by a product or service.
See id. §§ 8:2-8:4, at 8-6 to 8-14.1.
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appearance of labels, wrappers and containers used in packaging
the product. However, in modern parlance, "trade dress"
includes the total look of a product and its packaging and even
includes the design and shape of the product itself.
Trade dress encompasses the total image or overall impression
created by a product or its packaging.3

Essentially, trade dress functions to protect the goodwill'
associated with goods or services from a particular source by
preventing others from trading on the "look" of those goods. 4 At the
federal level, trade dress protection flows from § 43(a) of the Federal
Trademark Act (Lanham Act)."
Section 43(a) was originally
1

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:4, at 8-10 to 8-11. For examples of the vast range

of products and services the "total looks" of which have been afforded trade dress
status, see id. at 8-11 to 8-14.
13 Goodwill embodies "the favorable consideration shown by the purchasing
public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." White Tower Sys., Inc
v. White Castle, Inc., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937).
14 See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:1, at 8-2 to 8-3 (discussing,
among other
points, the requirement that the trade dress designate a source), § 8:2, at 8-6 to 8-8
(discussing the need to focus on the totality of elements).
is Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods .... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device ....
or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person .....
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1998).
The distinction between the protection afforded to trade dress under the
Lanham Act and the protection against "dilution" of "famous" marks created by the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998), should
be briefly noted. The case law interpreting the FTDA is in the process of
development, but a number of courts have developed multifactor tests, which are
similar to those used in trade dress analysis, to determine the applicability of the
FTDA. However, the thrust of the antidilution provisions of the FTDA is different
from the protection afforded by trade dress doctrine. Trade dress is designed to
prevent customer confusion by prohibiting one party from making their goods or
services seem as if they are from another's source. The FTDA is not directed at
customer confusion, but at preventing "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." K'Arsan Corp. v. Christian Dior

Perfumes, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27658, *8-*11 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (questioning whether the multifactor test for "likelihood
of confusion" applied under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act should be the same as that
applied under the FTDA); Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th
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designed to deal with concerns about matters such as false
designation of origin,' 6 but, over time, the applicability of § 43(a) has
been expanded to provide the basis for claims of violation of trade
dress.17 As a result, section 43(a) now provides trade dress with the
same sort of protection against one party unfairly passing off aspects
of its business as that of another's as the protection afforded to
trademarks. 8 Originally, trade dress protection was applied solely to
products; such protection, however, has also come to be extended to
services.' The extension of the doctrine to services was validated by
the landmark 1992 Supreme Court decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc"'
Whether applied to products or services, the federal courts
generally use the following tripartite test to determine whether trade
dress protection is available: (1) the trade dress to be protected must
be either inherently distinctive or have acquired a secondary
Cir. 1999); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44-46 (1st Cir. 1998); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:70, at 24-117 to 24-121 (noting that antidilution
principles are not tied to a likelihood of confusion). For an interesting overview of
trademark dilution issues, discussed in the context of franchising, see generally
Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17-SPG FRANCHISE L.J.
111 (1998).
16 False designation of origin involves some
affirmative act by which one party
falsely represents itself as the owner or source of another's product or service. See
Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) ("a claim [of false
designation] requires the existence of 'some affirmative act whereby [the defendant]
falsely represented itself as the owner of [the plaintiffs computer program]'")
(quoting Cognotec Servs. Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 862 F. Supp. 45, 51
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)) and the cases cited therein; Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection
and Practice § 7.02(5), at 7-26 & n.32 (39th rel. 1998) (noting that cases have held
that the phrase "false designation of origin" includes not only geographic origin but
also "origin of source or manufacture"). Under the Lanham Act, liability for false
designation of origin arises when "any person who, on or in connection with any
goods .... uses in commerce any... false designation of origin ... [that] is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods . . . by another person ....
" 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (1994).
17 See Martin P. Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product Simulation
Ovenview, C913 A.L.I.A.BA. 219 (April 14, 1994) at 221 (noting that trade dress protection grew out of the
Lanham Act).
18 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:1, at 8-4 to 8-6 (comparing trade dress and
trademark); Robert Butts, Franchise Trade Dress: What Do Courts Mean by the Terms
Distinctiveness, Functionality, and Likelihood of Confusion?, 16-SPG FRANCHISE L.J. 129,
129 (1997) (noting commensurate expansion of trade dress doctrine in context of
franchising); Robyn L. Phillips, DeterminingIf a Trade Dress Is Valid, 29 IDAHO L. REv.
457, 471 (1992-1993) (discussing the general nature of trade dress protection).
For a general discussion of the development of trade dress doctrine, see
PROTEcTING TRADE DRESS §§ 1.1-1.5, at 1-20 (Robert C. Dorr & Christopher H.
Munch. eds., 1992).
20 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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meaning, (2) the trade dress to be protected must be nonfunctional,
and (3) there must be a "likelihood of confusion" between the trade
dress to be protected and the other trade dress in question.'
The basic concern of the first factor of the test is that the dress
in question be both identifiable and distinctive.Y A trade dress is
"inherently distinctive" if its elements are so unique in the relevant
market that customers would perceive the trade dress as indicating a
definite product or service.2s A trade dress that is not in itself

21

See, e.g., id. at 769; Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d

736, 743 (2d Cir. 1998); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 536 (5th
Cir. 1998); Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046-47
(9th Cir. 1998); Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1997); Fun-Damental
Too, LTD. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997); Dorr-Oliver,
Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir.
1997).
As previously observed, there is a basic difference between the antidilution
thrust in the FTDA and the protection that trade dress affords. See supra note 15. As
a result, it should be noted that the three-element test for trade dress infringement is
not applicable to actions under the FTDA. As noted by Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the distinction between the two sorts of claims requires adopting at least a
four-element test for dilution claims:
tT]he Ninth Circuit recently elaborated four elements of federal
dilution claims ....
The statute requires plaintiffs to show that (1)
their mark is famous; (2) the defendant makes a commercial use of the
mark; (3) the defendant's use began after plaintiffs mark became
famous, and (4) the defendant's use dilutes the quality of plaintiffs
mark.
K'Arsan Corp. v. Christian Dior Perfumes, Inc., No. 97-1867, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
27658, *10 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998) (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)).
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 8:8-8:12, at 8-23 to 8-33 (surveying the
doctrine regarding secondary meaning in trade dress). For a provocative discussion
of the relation between inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning, see
generally Craig Allen Nard, Mainstreaming Trade Dress Law: The Rise and Fall of
Secondaty Meaning,1993 DET. C.L. REV. 37 (Spring 1993).
See 1 MCCARTh-, supra note 3, § 8:13, at 8-33 to 8-40 (discussing inherently
distinctive trade dress); Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 540 ("Trademarks and trade
dress are distinctive and protectable if they serve as indicators of source."); Sunbeam
Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 1997). The Sunbeam court
noted:
[T]he essence of a protected mark is its capacity to distinguish a
product and identify its source. The gravamen of trademark law is source
identification. Therefore, a given mark or trade dress is "inherently
distinctive" only if it is "sufficiently distinctive of itself to identify the
producer." "Trade dress is inherently distinctive when, by its 'intrinsic
nature,' it identifies the particular source of the product."
Id. at 252 (quoting Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263-64
(Fed. Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added). For recent developments in the law concerning
inherent distinctiveness, see Stephen F. Mohr, Recent Developments in Trade Dress Law,
inADvANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAw 115-20 (Baila H. Celedonia, Chair, 1998).
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inherently distinctive can become so if it has acquired a "secondary
meaning," that is, if, in fact, over time consumers have come to
perceive the trade dress in the relevant market as representing a
definite product or service.2
The second factor-the trade dress to be protected must be
"nonfunctional"-ensures that the trade dress to be protected does
not preclude the use of elements that must be utilized in a product or
service of that sort 5
Therefore, trade dress elements are
nonfunctional when they are not necessary to the design, use, or
purpose of the product or service.
While courts have, at times, struggled with the first two factors,"
the third factor-existence of a likelihood of confusion-has
One commentator, Richard
presented particular challenges2s
24 See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Although secondary meaning has been variously defined, its prime element 'isa
mental association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark and a single source of
the product.'") (citing 1 McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 15:2, at 516); Butts, supra note
18, at 145-47.
25 See Butts, supra note 18, at 148-49. For a general
discussion of functionality and
the development of functionality doctrine in the context of trade dress, see
PROTECTING TRADE DREss, supra note 19, §§ 6.1-7.25, at 225-327. For an insightful
argument connecting the doctrine of functionality in trade dress with constitutional
issues, see generally Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution:
The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection,80 MINN. L.REv. 595 (1996).

26

For a general discussion of the requirement of nonfunctional trade dress, see

SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACrIONER'S GUIDE § 2A:3.1, at 2A-6 to 2A13 (3d. ed. 1999); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:20, at 8-56 to 8-58; Butts, supra note

18, at 148-49, 153. For recent developments in the law concerning functionality, see
Mohr, supra note 23, at 120-22.
For examples of difficulties in determining inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning and nonfunctionality in the context of trade dress, see generally
Nancy Dwyer Chapman, Trade Dress Protection, in ADVANCED SEMINAR OF TRADEMARK
LAW (William M. Borchard, Chairman, 1993); see also, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The line between
functionality and nonfunctionality is not, however, brightly drawn in every case.").
Although trade or service mark infringement and trade dress infringement can
represent different sorts of actions and issues, the analysis of the likelihood of
confusion should be the same in either case. The federal circuits seem to agree with
the words of the Eighth Circuit when it stated: "The Supreme Court has held that
there is no textual basis for applying different analyses to the protection of
trademarks and trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Children's
Factory, Inc. v. Benee's Toys, Inc., 160 F.3d 489, 494 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992); Aromatique, Inc. v.
Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[tlhe difference
between trade dress and trademark is no longer of importance in determining
whether trade dress is protected by federal law"); see also Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd.
v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998).
Further, as noted by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Two Pesos that
the test for both registered and unregistered marks and trade dress should be the
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Kirkpatrick, has framed the difficulties in determining the likelihood
of confusion as follows:
[T] he question of trademark infringement is primarily one of the
psychology-cognitive and behavioral-of consumers. A mark
infringes when it is likely to cause a mental state of confusion in
an appreciable number of consumers. Whether such confusion is
likely can rarely if ever be decided on the basis of direct evidence.
The likely mental state of a large consumer population is elusive;
the analyst learns to expect the unexpected. The law has
developed a complex analytical strategy with numerous rules by
which the likely mental state is inferred from the objective facts of
the given case.
In the process of outlining the analysis and compiling the main
rules, I have found that the formulation-"the only rule is that
there are no rules"-is tempting but not quite right. The only
"rule" in likelihood of confusion cases is that no rule is
meaningful unless it is applied to the facts for the purpose of
understanding the consumer's expectations, perceptions, and
memory of the trademarks at issue. Without constant reference
to this psychology, all the talk to follow of multifactor tests,
"dominant portions," product relatedness, channels of trade, etc.,
is unhelpful. Without check, such talk easily and often assumes a
life of its own.29

same: "The same tests apply to both trademarks and trade dress to determine
whether they are protectible and whether they have been infringed, regardless of
whether they are registered or unregistered." Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,
155 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768-70, 773-74).
"Likelihood of confusion is evaluated by reference to the same basic factors in all
cases of conflict of trade symbols, whether of trade names or trademarks, service
marks or trade dress, registered or unregistered-all are tested the same way."
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 2.4 (citations omitted). A leading commentator sees
a large degree of coalescence of trademarks and trade dress as categories of
intellectual property in American law:
The reason for making a semantic distinction between "trademarks"
and "trade dress" is largely historical . . . . But today, any such
distinctions have largely disappeared.
Today, many types of
designations protectable as "trade dress" are also registerable as
"trademarks." Today, unregistered trade dress is protected under
federal Lanham Act § 43(a) under the same rules as are trademarks.
Thus, the history of American law throughout much of the Twentieth
Century is the gradual disappearance of distinctions between the law of
"trade dress" and that of "trademarks."
1 MCCARThY, supra note 3, § 8:1, at 8-4.
For these reasons, this Article will treat the tests for likelihood of confusion in
trademark and service mark, on the one hand, and trade dress, on the other, as
identical, unless otherwise noted.
9
IRPATICK, supra note 7, at xviii-xix.
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The difficulties to which Kirkpatrick alludes are mirrored in the
fact that the federal courts consistently have been forced to develop
and then, ironically enough, to struggle with cumbersome-and in
many ways unsatisfactory-multifactor tests for the presence of the
likelihood of confusion." Such multifactor tests are not set forth in,
nor is their use required by, the Lanham Act. Rather, the federal
courts have developed the various versions of such tests as they have
wrestled with situations in which a likelihood of confusion has been
claimed.3 ' Although, as the review of the federal circuits set forth
below will demonstrate, the multifactor tests developed by those
circuits vary to some degree, they often share factors and are uniform
in their unwieldy complexity. This complexity is attributable, in part,
to the fact that the standard for trade dress infringement requires
only a likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion on the part of
consumers, and so the required confusion need only be probable."2
On the other hand, given that likelihood of confusion often has been
identified as the most important element of the three factors in
determining the presence of § 43(a) infringement, the complexity of
the tests for likelihood of confusion is particularly problematic.3
30 See id. at § 2.4; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§
24:30-24:43, at 2-7 to 2-16.
Although this Article focuses on the inherent difficulty in formulating a test for the
presence of a likelihood of confusion, the expansive nature of trade dress protection
itself also makes the creation and application of an appropriate test problematic for
other reasons. Most notably, even assuming that a coherent, straightforward, and
noncontroversial test for the presence of a likelihood of confusion could be
developed, protection of something as broad as trade dress-especially with respect
to product design-could significantly impede competition. As one commentator
notes:
In the 1990s, several courts, reacting against a wave of over-expansive
and inflated claims of trade dress in product shapes and features, laid
down new, more stringent rules. These new rules made it considerably
more difficult to assert trade dress protection in product shapes. Many
of these courts were concerned because the policy of free competition
dictates that trade dress law does not create "back-door patents,"
substituting for the strict requirements of utility patent law. Some
commentators argued that trade dress protection for product designs
inevitably conflicts with federal patent policy.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:5, at 8-16.
31 See4 McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:30, at
24-51.
32 See Children's Factory, Ina, 160 F.3d at 494 ("In order to find
a likelihood of
confusion, this court has stated that 'there must be a substantial likelihood that the
public will be confused.'" (quoting WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th
Cir. 1984)); Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 1997). Actual confusion
is not necessary for there to be infringement. However, the mere possibility of
consumer confusion is not enough. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:12, at 23-37 to
23-39. "Likelihood" is synonymous with "probability." Id. § 23:3, at 23-11.
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
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II. THE TESTS FOR "LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION" EMPLOYED BY THE
FEDERAL CIRCUITS

Many of the factors utilized in the federal courts' multifactor
tests were originally set forth in sections 729 and 731 of the
Restatement of Torts (First).3 The key case law progenitor of the
multifactor test approach was the Second Circuit's 1961 decision in

Polaroid Corp. v. PolaradElectronics Corp.3 Since Polaroid,each of the

concurring). "Under the Lanham Act [§ 43(a)], the ultimate test is whether the
public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks .... ." See id.
(quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1979); see also Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042,
1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the complexity in determining whether the mark at
issue is distinctive).
"Likelihood of confusion" is the basic test of both common-law
trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark infringement
While issues of priority, secondary meaning, assignment, and the
like, may be present in some cases, the test of likelihood of confusion is
the touchstone of trademark infringement as well as unfair
competition."
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:1, at 23-6, 23-8.
See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 2.4; see also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 3, §
23:19, at 23-52.
287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). In Polaroid, Polaroid Corporation, registered
owner of the trademark "Polaroid," sued the defendant, Polarad Electronics
Corporation, claiming that the defendant's use of "Polarad" as a trademark and in its
name infringed Polaroid's federal and state trademarks and constituted unfair
competition. In attempting to determine whether infringement had occurred, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be
protected with respect to goods other than those to which its owner has
applied it, has long been vexing and does not become easier of
solution with the years. Neither of our recent decisions so heavily
relied upon by the parties... affords much assistance .... Where the
products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function
of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood
that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the
reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the
quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities--the
court may have to take still other variables into account. Here
plaintiff's mark is a strong one and the similarity between the two
names is great, but the evidence of actual confusion, when analyzed, is
not impressive.
Id. at 495 (citations omitted). For discussion of the seminal role played by the
Polaroiddecision, see Hoffman, supra note 17, at 223; KIRKPATICK, supra note 7, at §
2.4; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:19, at 23-53; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:30,
24:32, at 24-51, 24-52 to 24-54.
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federal circuits has developed multifactor tests, usually springing
from, as one commentator has put it, that circuit's "fountainhead
case. " 3 In studying the tests currently employed by the federal
circuits, it is striking to observe how often the courts note that,
despite the often complicated and extensive list of factors that have to
be weighed, the tests are to be considered contingent, incomplete,
and subject to extensive revision. 37
A. FirstCircuit
Even while articulating the eight-factor test for determining a
likelihood of confusion utilized by the circuit, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in LP. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co struck a
cautionary note in deeming the factors enumerated as neither
individually determinative nor exclusive:
This court has identified eight factors to be weighed in
determining likelihood of confusion:
(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the goods; (3)
the relationship between the parties' channels of trade; (4) the
relationship between the parties' advertising; (5) the classes of
prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the
defendant's intent in adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of
the plaintiffs mark.... No one factor is necessarily determinative,
but each must be considered. The factors are non-exclusive,
however, and are not always apt to the particular facts of a case.
In addition, the first factor, similarity, "is determined on the basis
of the total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of
individual features."39
B. Second Circuit
As noted above, the Polaroid case is generally regarded as the

KiRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 2.4. "While the list of factors followed
by the
courts all owe their origin to the 1938 Restatement of Torts, each of the thirteen
federal circuit courts of appeals has developed its own version of the list and each
appears to be jealous of its own formulation of the factors." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
3, § 24:30, at 24-51.
37 See KIRKPATRiCK, supra note 7,
at § 2.4.
38 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
39 Id. at 43 (citations omitted)
(addressing a claimed infringement of water
faucet design); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1997)
(applying the eight-factor test to an alleged infringement of design of the "Viper"
"muscle car"); Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1993) (applying the eight-factor test to the claimed infringement of designation
"Weed Eater" by "Leaf Eater").
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judicial wellspring of the multifactor tests. ° Recent Second Circuit
decisions have continued to apply the Polaroid test:
The law of this Circuit requires that courts consider the eight
factors elaborated in Polaroid in determining whether there is a
likelihood of confusion. These factors are: "(1) the strength of
the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that
the prior owner will 'bridge the gap'; (5) actual confusion; (6) the
defendant's good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the
defendant's product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers." 41

C. Third Circuit
As noted in SNA, Inc. v. Array,4 the Third Circuit has developed
a ten-element multifactor test:
The Third Circuit has established a ten-factor test to be used in
deciding whether a likelihood of confusion exists: (1) the degree
of similarity between the marks; (2) the strength of the mark; (3)
the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4)
the length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence
of actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in
adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7)
whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through
the same channels of trade and advertised through the same
media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sale
efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the
minds of the public because of the similarity of function; (10)
other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the
prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's
market.4
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:30, at 24-51. As McCarthy notes, the Second
Circuit's test in Polaroidwas, basically, a recasting of the nine-factor test suggested by
sections 729 and 731 of the 1938 Restatement (First) of Torts. See id.; see also id., §
24:29, at 24-49 to 24-50 (noting the factors included in the 1938 Restatement of
Torts). The current test is found in section 21 of the Restatement of Unfair
Competition. Se RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON § 21(a) (1995).
41 Nora Beverages., Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 745
(2d Cir.
1998) (citations omitted) (involving claimed infringement of design of bottled water
container); see also Streetwise Maps v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743-46 (2d Cir.
1998) (applying the Polaroid test to a claimed infringement of a street map design);
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1002-04 (2d Cir.
1997) (applying the Polaroidtest to a claimed infringement of design of "toilet-bank"
toy coin bank).
51 F. Supp.2d 542 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
4
Id. at 549 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1229 (3d Cir. 1978)) (applying the ten-factor test to a claimed infringement of
40
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D. Fourth Circuit
In setting forth the eleven-element multifactor test employed by
the Fourth Circuit, the court in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
America underscored that the listed factors are not the only ones that
might be considered and that, in particular cases, some of the
enumerated factors might not even be applicable.5 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also noted that the multifactor test
only serves as a "focus":
We have, over the course of several cases, developed factors for
courts to consider in determining the likelihood of confusion.
They include (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark; (2)
the similarity of the two marks; (3) the similarity of the goods or
services which the marks identify; (4) the similarity of the facilities
used by the parties in conducting their businesses; (5) the
similarity of advertising used by the parties; (6) the defendant's
intent in using the mark; (7) actual confusion; (8) the proximity
of the products as they are actually sold; (9) the probability that
the senior mark owner will "bridge the gap" by entering the
defendant's market; (10) the quality of the defendant's product
in relationship to the quality of the senior mark owner's product;
and (11) the sophistication of the buyers. The list of these
factors, however, is neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and some of
the factors may not always be relevant or equally emphasized in
each case. We articulate them to focus an inquiry that must be
tailored to the factual circumstances of each case.
E. Ffth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit in Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd. articulated
a flexible seven-factor test:
In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, this
court considers the following nonexhaustive list of factors: (1)
the type of mark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between
the two marks, (3) the similarity of the products or services, (4)
the identity of the retail outlets and purchasers, (5) the identity of
the advertising media used, (6) the defendant's intent, and (7)

designation of seaplane); see also A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores,
Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1999) (involving claimed infringement of
designation "Miracle Bra" by "Miraclesuit").
110 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1046 (1998).
4 See id. at
242.
46 Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted) (applying this eleven-factor test to the
claimed
infringement of design of fishing rod).
47 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
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any evidence of actual confusion. No single factor is dispositive,
and a finding of a likelihood of confusion does not reuire a
positive finding on a majority of these "digits of confusion."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,49 however, that this test is subject to
some variation:
Finally, having detennined that the American Classic Mixmaster
(R) is entitled to trade dress protection, we must determine
whether that trade dress has been infringed by the West Bend
"Infringement occurs only when there is a
stand mixers.
likelihood of confusion between the products of the plaintiff and
the defendant." Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact,
which we review for clear error.
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the district court
must apply the "digits of confusion" test. The factors to be
weighed in this calculus include (1) similarity of the two products;
(2) identity of retail outlets and purchasers; (3) identity of
advertising media; (4) strength of the trademark or trade dress;
(5) intent of the defendant; (6) similarity of design; (7) actual
confusion; and (8) degree of care employed by consumers. Proof
of actual confusion is not a prerequisite, and no single factor is
dispositive of the likelihood of confusion.

F. Sixth Circuit
As set forth in K'Arsan Corp. v. ChristianDior Pefumes, Inc.,51 the
Sixth Circuit has developed an eight-factor test to determine whether
there is likelihood of confusion. As the court makes clear, however,
that test cannot be applied mechanically nor may all of its elements
be relevant:
The district court appropriately applied the Frisch's "likelihood of
confusion" test to K'Arsan's federal infringement and unfair
competition claims, comparing "K'Arsan SUN POWDER" to
"Terra Bella Poudre de Soleil Sun Powder." The Frisch's test
evaluates eight factors that "imply no mathematical precision, but
are simply a guide to help determine whether confusion is likely.
• . . and not all of these factors may be particularly helpful in any

48 Id. at 543 (citations omitted) (applying a seven-factor test to the claimed
infringement of a golf course design).
123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997).

50 Id. at 257 (quoting Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Gin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256

(5th Cir. 1989)) (noting the proper application of the eight-factor test to a claimed
infringement of stand mixer design).
51 No. 97-1867, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27658 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998).
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given case." The factors are:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark;
(2) the relatedness of the goods;
(3) the similarity of the goods;
(4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) the marketing channels used;
(6) the likely degree of purchaser care;
(7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark;
(8) the likelihood of expansion of the product lines.52
G. Seventh Circuit
As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit elaborated in
Dorr-Oliver,Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.," the circuit has fashioned a sevenelement test:
In evaluating the likelihood of consumer confusion for this claim
of trade dress infringement, the factors to be considered include:
(1) the similarity of the trade dresses; (2) the products to which
the trade dresses are attached; (3) the area and manner of
concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by

consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiffs trade dress; (6)
actual confusion; and (7) intent of the defendant to pass off its
products as those of the plaintiff.5'
H. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has developed a six-factor test exemplified by
the recital of elements in Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.:M

52 Id. at *11-*12 (citations omitted) (applying an eight-factor test to the claimed
infringement of designation of sun tanning powder); see also Ferrari S.pA v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying the eight-factor test to the claimed
infringement of automobile design); Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 759
F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the eight-factor test to the claimed
infringement of the "Big Boy" mark because of the defendant's use of the name
"Shoney's" and the association between the "Big Boy" and the name "Shoney's");
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983)
(applying the eight-factor test to the alleged infringement on the use of the phrase
"Here'sJohnny").
53 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996), afftd, 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir. 1997).
M Id. at 380 (citations omitted) (applying a seven-factor
test to the alleged
infringement of the starch washer design); see also Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v.
Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the seven-factor test to an
alleged infringement of a fiberglass pipe design).
170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999).
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To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, we must
consider six factors, none of which alone is dispositive: (1) the
strength of the owner's mark; (2) the similarity of the owner's
mark and the alleged infringer's mark; (3) the degree of
competition between the products; (4) the alleged infringer's
intent to "pass off" its goods as the trademark owner's; (5)
incidents of actual confusion; and, (6) the type of product, its
cost, and conditions of purchase. s6

I. Ninth Circuit
As noted in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp-,5 the Ninth Circuit employs an eight-factor test."
As observed by that court, the test is "pliant," and the absolute and
Id. at 830 (citing Co-Rect Prods., Inc., 780 F.2d at 1330) (applying a six-factor test
to the alleged infringement on the name of frozen-food entrees); see also Children's
Factory, Inc. v. Benee's Toys, Inc., 160 F.3d 489, 494 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Co-Rect
Prods., Inc., 780 F.2d at 1330) (applying a six-factor test to the claimed infringement
of toy designs).
57 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
At one time, as the court pointed out in Eclipse Associates Ltd. v. Data General
Corp., the Ninth Circuit had two versions of the multifactor test for likelihood of
confusion:
In the instant case the district court used the following five-factor test
to determine if likelihood of confusion existed:
1. strength of the mark;
2. similarity of the mark;
3. class of goods and marketing channels;
4. evidence of actual confusion; and
5. intent of second user.
Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1117 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted). The Eclipse court went on to note that there also existed an
eight-factor test that could be applied to determine the likelihood of confusion:
The Sleekcrafl [eight]-factor test lists the following factors as relevant in
determining likelihood of confusion:
1. strength of the mark;
2. proximity of the goods;
3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion;
5. marketing channels used;
6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by
the purchaser;
7. defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and
8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
The Ninth Circuit has made no firm distinction between the [five]factor and [eight]-factor tests for likelihood of confusion in trademark
infringement cases. In some cases the first test is used, in others the
second is used.
Id. at 1117 n.3 (citations omitted) (applying the eight-factor test to the claimed
infringement of the designation "ECLIPSE" by use of the same term); see also 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:39, at 24-58 to 24-59.
56
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relative importance of the listed factors is variable." Further, the
factors listed are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, and factors not
present in the enumerated list may be "quite important":
"The core element of trademark infringement is the likelihood of
confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the marks is likely to
confuse customers about the source of the products." We look to
the following factors for guidance in determining the likelihood
of confusion: similarity of the conflicting designations; relatedness
or proximity of the two companies' products or services; strength
of Brookfield's mark; marketing channels used; degree of care
likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting goods; West
Coast's intent in selecting its mark; evidence of actual confusion;
and likelihood of expansion in product lines. These eight factors
are often referred to as the Sleekcraft factors.
A word of caution: this eight-factor test for likelihood of
confusion is pliant. Some factors are much more important than
others, and the relative importance of each individual factor will
be case-specific. Although some factors - such as the similarity
of the marks and whether the two companies are direct
competitors - will always be important, it is often possible to
reach a conclusion with respect to likelihood of confusion after
considering only a subset of the factors. Moreover, the foregoing
list does not purport to be exhaustive, and non-listed variables
may often be quite important.!

. Tenth Circuit
As articulated in King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,6'
the Tenth Circuit has developed a six-element test. However, as the
court cautions, the factors are not individually determinative, and the
weight and role of the factors can vary from case to case:
The Tenth Circuit has identified six factors, derived from the
Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938), that aid in determining
whether a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks:
(a) the degree of similarity between the marks;
See Brookfield Communications, Inc., v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 147
F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
60 Id.
(citations omitted) (reviewing the use of a registered trademark as the
59

domain name of an internet site); see also Moscow Distillery Cristall v. Pepsico, Inc.,
NO. 96-36217, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4428, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1998) (noting the
lack of a rigid test for determining the likelihood of confusion in the Ninth Circuit);
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (outlining the
relevant factors in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion in the
claimed infringement of designation "Slickcraft" by "Sleekcraft").
61 185 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999).
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(b) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark;
(c) evidence of actual confusion;
(d) the relation in use and the manner of marketing between the
goods or services marketed by the competing parties;
(e) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and
(f) the strength or weakness of the marks.
"This list is not exhaustive. All of the factors are interrelated, and
no one factor is dispositive." While we consider these factors to
determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists regardless of
whether the trademark infringement suit involves source or
sponsorship confusion, the weight afforded to some of the factors
differs when applied in these separate contexts.
In both
confusion of source and confusion of sponsorship cases, the
similarity of the marks factor constitutes the heart of our
analysis.

K Eleventh Circuit
As elaborated in Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc.,
the Eleventh Circuit has evolved a seven-part test to determine
likelihood of confusion. Even as it applies that test, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Jellibeans notes the
indeterminate nature of the test and the variable nature of the factors
of which it consists:
The "likely to confuse" test is not as unidimensional as its
appellation would imply. While there are no subparts to this test
in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions there are a
number of factors which may bear on the question of likelihood
of confusion. In Safeway, this court enunciated a number of such
factors: (1) How distinctive is the plaintiffs mark? Do consumers
strongly identify plaintiffs service mark with his services? This is
important because the more distinctive the plaintiffs mark, the
stronger it is considered, and the more protection it is accorded
from confusingly similar marks; (2) How similar are the designs of
Id. at 1089-90 (quoting Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1530 (10th Cir. 1994)) (claimed infringement of designation
"King of the Mountain" by "Jeep King of the Mountain Downhill Series"); see also
Universal Money Ctrs., 22 F.3d at 1529-1530 (setting forth a somewhat different
formulation of the Tenth Circuit multifactor test in a suit claiming infringement of
designation "Universal" by use of same term); ef. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods
Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[T]his court has used the criteria set out in
Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938).... ." in determining whether there is a likelihood
of confusion between "Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts").
' 716 F.2d 833 (llth Cir. 1983).
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the plaintiffs and defendant's marks? Obviously, the greater the
similarity, the greater the likelihood that purchasers will confuse
the plaintiffs and defendant's services. This principle also
applies to subsidiary facts 3, 4, and 5; (3) How similar are the
services the plaintiffs and defendant's marks represent; (4) How
similar are the plaintiffs and defendant's retail outlets and their
customers; (5) How similar is the advertising the plaintiff and
defendant use; (6) Whether the defendant intended that
purchasers would confuse his service mark with the plaintiffs
mark; and (7) Whether people were actually confused by the
similarity of the marks. The court evaluates and weighs these
subsidiary findings to determine, as a matter of fact, whether
consumers are likely to confuse the defendant's services with the
plaintiff's services.

L. FederalCircuit
The Federal Circuit, which reviews the decisions of the Patent
and Trademark Office,ro generally applies the thirteen-factor "DuPont
6
test," named after the 1973 case in which the test was developed: 6
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services as described in an application or registration or in
connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
Id. at 840 (explaining the application of a seven-factor test to determine the
likelihood of confusion in a claimed infringement of the designation "Jellibeans" by
"Lollipops"); see also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1999), reh g denied, 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying Eleventh Circuit test to
the claimed infringement of eyeglass display rack designs); Wesco Mfg., Inc. v.
Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 (11th Cir. 1987) (using
the seven-factor test to determine the likelihood of confusion between "Sun Fari"

and "Sur Fari"); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160,
1164-66 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining the application of the seven-factor test to the
claimed infringement of designation "Safeway" by use of the same term).
6 Because the Federal Circuit reviews the decisions of the
Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), as noted by Kirkpatrick, it is also the case that "[t]he PTO applies the
Federal Circuit factors (known as the duPont test) in both the examination of
applications and the adjudication of contested cases." KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at §
2.4.

See In re E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (1973), see also, 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:43, at 24-61.
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made, i.e., "impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar

goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there

has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house
mark, "family" mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a
prior mark:
(a)A mere "consent" to register or use.
(b)Agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion,
i.e., limitations on continued use of the marks by each party.
(c)Assignment of mark, application, registration and good
will of the related business.
(d)Laches and estoppel attributable to the owner of prior
mark and indicative of lack of confusion.
(Il)The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others
from use of its mark on its goods.
(12)The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or

substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.67
A number of times, however, the Federal Circuit has noted its
willingness to abandon any-and even all but one-of those factors
in "appropriate" cases: "We have repeatedly held that findings based
on a single DuPont factor may, in some cases, be so ' important as to
be dispositive of the likelihood of confusion analysis." 8
In other instances, the Federal Circuit has applied the

E.I. duPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; see also IRKPATicK, supra note 7, at § 2.4.
Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Tocad Co., Ltd., No. 99-1128, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20197, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1999) (citations omitted) (addressing a
67

claimed infringement of the designations "AQUAFRESH," "AQUA-FRESH," and
"AQUA-FRESH FLEX" by "AQUA FLOSS"); see also Champagne Louis Roederer, S.A.
v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that one single
duPont factor may be dispositive in determining the likelihood of confusion while
deciding the claimed infringement of designations "CRISTAL" and "CRISTAL
CHAMPAGNE" by "CRYSTAL CREEK"); Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951
F.2d 330, 332-33 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (giving dispositive weight to the difference in

appearance of the marks "FROOT LOOPS" and "FROOTEE ICE").
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multifactor test applied'in the circuit out of which the case arose.6
M. District of Columbia Circuit
The meager precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit has
not, as yet, established a distinct multifactor test. The eight-factor
Polaroid test, however, has been employed by district judges in that
circuit. 70
As the above survey highlights, the factors employed by the
various courts differ from circuit to circuit, and can even vary within
circuits depending upon the judges involved in the decision.7 ' There
is, however, a core of relatively noncontroversial-because generally
shared-factors present in the multifactor tests that can be
discernedn (1) An inquiry into the presence of actual confusion
concerning the trade dress among consumers of the products and/or
services; (2) an examination of the strength of the trade dress of the
senior holder in the relevant market(s); (3) an examination of the
similarity of the trade dress of the products and/or services; (4)
consideration of the proximity and/or relatedness of the products
and/or services and the channels through which they are marketed;
(5) an inquiry into the nature of the consumers of the products
and/or services and their degree of care and sophistication; (6) an
examination of the intent of the junior user."
Often, however, the role that these common factors play in
See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
reh'g denied, 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying Eleventh Circuit seven-factor
test on the claimed infringement of design of eyeglass display). McCarthy notes that,
generally, the Federal Circuit "uses the thirteen-part test developed in the 1973
duPont case." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:43, at 24-61.
70 See Malarkey-Taylor Assocs., Inc. v. Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass'n, 929 F.
Supp. 473, 477 (D.D.C. 1996) (applying the Second Circuit's eight-factor Polaroidtest
to a claimed infringement of designation "WirelessNOW"); cf Blinded Veterans
Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (referencing
Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions discussing the role of alleged infringer's intent
while addressing the claimed infringement of designations "blind and related terms,"
"veterans," and "BAV"). McCarthy's treatise notes the following with respect to the
District of Columbia Circuit: "There is little precedent on [the use of a multifactor
test] in the District of Columbia Circuit upon which to base a firm prediction, but
the court would undoubtedly use a multifactor test similar to that used in the other
circuits." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:42, at 24-61. Kirkpatrick notes that the
District of Columbia Circuit has looked to Ninth, Seventh, and Second Circuits for
guidance on this issue. See KMRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 2.4.
71 Kirkpatrick observes that such differences extend between circuits and
"sometimes from one panel ofjudges to another within a court." KiRKPATRiCK, supra
note 7, at § 2.4; see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:30, at 24-5 1.
7
See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 2.4.
73 See id.
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determining a likelihood of confusion is problematic, as the courts
applying these factors have emphasized time and again."
For
example, the first (and what is often cited as the foremost) common
factor above, actual confusion on the part of consumers, m seemingly
would be both extremely easy to establish and highly, if not
conclusively, probative of a likelihood of confusion. 6 After all, with
respect to its existence, actual confusion can be established by the
testimony of confused consumers or by surveys or other empirical
methods." Further, instances of consumers actually confusing one
product and/or service with another would seem to establish much
more than a mere "likelihood" of confusion. Nevertheless, actual
confusion is not as transparent or conclusive a factor as it might
seem.
However tautologous such a stance is, the courts have made it
plain that they will consider instances of actual confusion as evidence
of a likelihood of confusion only when they are satisfied that a
likelihood of confusion is actually present. As a result, at times,
courts will simply discount instances of actual confusion when they
deem such confusion to be merely "isolated" or "short-lived,"m or
74

See id.

As Kirkpatrick notes:
Actual confusion is often highly rated as the "best" or "most persuasive"
evidence of likelihood of confusion, making it the "most important"
factor for some. Such emphasis has led a few courts close to
presuming likelihood of confusion if meaningful actual confusion is
proved. But that result is not followed by all.
Id. at § 2.6. On the other hand, Kirkpatrick cites examples of other decisions
indicating that the strength of the mark, the alleged infringer's intent, and other
factors-or even combinations of factors-are of paramount importance. See id. at §
2.6.
76 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:13, at
23-39 to 23-42.
See id. § 23:13-18, at 23-39 to 23-51, § 23:63, at 23-146 to 23-147. In passing, it
should be noted that the majority of federal circuits consider the presence of a
likelihood of confusion to be a matter of fact. See id., §§ 23:71-74, at 23-155 to 23-165.
7s See, e.g., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385,
1393 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding 7 out of 80,000 forms that were misdirected is too minimal to constitute
likelihood of confusion); Homeowner's Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc.,
931 F.2d 1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount
Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982)) (finding that "short-lived
confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is worthy of
little weight"); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.
1980) (stating that 3 instances of actual confusion in 15 years is insufficient to find a
likelihood of confusion); Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholder Funding, Inc.,
835 F. Supp. 182, 197 (D. Del. 1993); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 182 F.
Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (finding that letters misdirected due to carelessness
were too few to constitute a likelihood of confusion when compared to the total
volume of correspondence received by each of the parties on a daily basis); see also 3
75
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when they consider the confusion to be the result of "mere
carelessness" or "inattention and indifference," or even simple
consumer error.7 In other words, the courts will discount even actual
confusion in instances in which they regard it "clear" that such actual8
0
confusion does not evidence a "real" likelihood of confusion.
Furthermore, at the other end of the spectrum, courts will not
necessarily conclude that there is an absence of a likelihood of
confusion in cases in which no instances of actual confusion can be
shown.8 '
Moreover, the courts are careful to exclude evidence of actual
confusion unless it represents confusion of what the court determines
to be both "relevant"o and "reasonably prudent"O consumers.
Additionally, courts often gauge likelihood of confusion in terms of
what the particular court considers to be the special qualities of the
products and services, on the one hand, or the consumers of such

MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:13, at 23-42.
3 McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:13, at 23-41 (citing instances of "secretarial

carelessness," "inattention and indifference," or "consumer error").
So One commentator has noted that courts have held that examples of actual
confusion can even be rebutted as evidence of likelihood of confusion for purposes
of obtaining a grant of summary judgment:
The existence of some evidence of instances of actual confusion does
not necessarily prevent the grant of a summary judgment of dismissal
for lack of triable issue of a likelihood of confusion. A court may find

evidence of actual confusion insufficient to present a triable issue of
fact where evidence in rebuttal provides a reasonable explanation
discounting isolated instances of confusion.
Id.

81 Courts generally do not take the absence of proved actual confusion as
dispositive of the fact that no confusion exists:
That there are no proved instances of actual confusion does not
necessarily mean that no one has been confused. Many may have been
confused without realizing it. Lack of actual confusion does not
necessarily demonstrate that confusion is unlikely. One court
presumed that the "vast majority" of confused persons do not contact
either source.
Courts often excuse lack of evidence of actual confusion by saying
that it is very difficult to find.
IRKPATRICK, supranote 7, at § 7.8 (citations omitted). Kirkpatrick also supplies a list
of rationales used by the courts in explaining the inability to show instances of actual
confusion. See id.; see also 3 McCARTmv, supra note 3, § 23:18, at 23-51.
82 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3,
§ 23:5, at 23-15.

See id. §§ 23:91-94, at 23-180 to 23-187. As the discussion in McCarthy makes
clear, the notion of a "reasonably prudent buyer" is hedged about with qualifications,
such as: "having normal intelligence," "acting with ordinary care," but also being
"ignorant, gullible, credulous," but not "indifferent or foolish." See id. §§ 23:92-23:93,
at 23-181 to 23-185.
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products and services, on the other." Taken in sum, then, the role
played by actual confusion in determining a likelihood of confusion
is hedged about by the courts with cautions and exceptions that
render its function far from straightforward or transparent.
Putting to one side the factor of the presence or absence of
actual confusion, an examination of the second through fifth of the
common factors cited above makes apparent a singular fact: These
factors are in a certain sense epiphenomenal, in that they are not
directed toward establishing or gauging the cognitive state of
consumers, that is, the presence in the minds of consumers of a
likelihood of confusion. Instead, these factors are directed toward
assessing the presence of a context for such confusion to exist or
develop. In other words, these factors-the relative strength of the
trade dress, the similarity of the trade dress, the degree to which the
products or services are related, and the nature of the relevant
consumers--seek to determine whether the commercial arena and
the relevant consumer participants are susceptible to the presence of
confusion. While such factors may be helpful in assessing what might
be termed the likelihood of a likelihood of confusion, neither they, nor
the sixth factor, which examines the intent of the alleged infringer,
address the key question of whether the cognitive state of a likelihood
of confusion exists.
Given the multifactor tests surveyed above and the openly
problematic nature of their application, these tests seemingly add up
to little more than carefully fashioned subjective, multi-prong hooks
from which courts might hang their hats; albeit rather poor subjective
hooks given the courts' expressions of dissatisfaction. Which is to say
that the tests appear to be designed to throw the determination of a
likelihood of confusion on the subjective impression of the judge or
judges hearing the lawsuit. The problematic nature of these tests,
however, is not dictated by the desire of the courts to avoid
objectivity, but by the nature of the inquiry itself.
While the continual application of multifactor tests of the sort
canvassed above may provide a pragmatic veneer of uniformity and
In making the determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion,
courts often look to the cost, exclusiveness, or special or technical nature of the
products or services and to the wealth, sophistication, or professional status of the
consumers. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 23:95-23:103, at 23-187 to 23-202. For
an insightful discussion concerning the relation between likelihood of confusion and
the nature of products and their related consumers in the context of expensive
automobiles (and cheaper replicas), consider the spirited exchange between the
majority and the dissent in FerrariS.p.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241-45, 1247-48
(6th Cir. 1991); id. at 1248-53 (Kennedy,J, dissenting).
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completeness, the prospects for fundamental improvement of the
essentially indeterminate nature of those tests must remain extremely
dim. This is true because the creation of a coherent test for
likelihood of confusion must be grounded in a secure conceptual
grasp of the human experience of resemblance. As will be explained
below, however, an investigation of the conceptual landscape of the
human ability to perceive resemblance and related perceptual
abilities reveals an extremely and irreducibly intricate conceptual
topography. As a result, the development of a coherent and/or
transparent test for likelihood of confusion seems impossible.
III. WITTGENSTEIN'S DISCUSSION OF "SEEING AS": CONCEPTUALIZING
THE ABILrIY TO PERCEIVE RESEMBLANCE

The motivations that underlie the activities of a philosopher
investigating the concepts associated with a certain aspect of human
activity and the motivations of the courts seeking to develop a test for
the presence of that activity are fundamentally different in nature:
The philosopher seeks, as much as possible, to discern and grasp, at
the most basic level, a conceptual structure; the courts seek to
develop a workable conceptual basis with which to distinguish
between the presence or absence of a state of affairs. While the
motivations may vary, the basic nature of the activity is very similar.
In both cases, a conceptual basis for dividing and categorizing human
activity must be developed. Because, however, the investigations of
the philosopher often take place at a more "fundamental" level than
the investigations of the courts, insofar as the philosopher is not
simply seeking a workable test, but is exploring the very conceptual
basis upon which any such test can be erected, it can be useful to
consider the results of the philosopher's investigations in order to
evaluate the status of the tests that the courts develop. The
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein undertook such investigations in
the context of the human ability to perceive resemblance. By way of
providing a bit of a frame for a discussion of Wittgenstein's results, it
seems useful to provide a short introduction to the man and his work.
Born on April 26, 1889, in Vienna, Austria, Ludwig JosefJohann
Wittgenstein has been called one of the greatest philosophers of the
twentieth century.m Often considered to have produced in his
85 See LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN:

THE MAN AND His PHILOSOPHY 11 (K.T. Fann ed.,

1967) ("Ludwig Wittgenstein is without doubt one of the greatest philosophers of
our time and numerous philosophers in English-speaking countries would be quite
prepared to describe him as the greatest. His place in the history of philosophy is
comparable to that of Darwin in biology and Einstein in physics.").
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"earlier" and "later" phases essentially antipodal philosophical
positions, Wittgenstein was certainly one of the most enigmatic and
challenging thinkers of this century.86 Originally, Wittgenstein was
trained in mechanical engineering, an interest that eventually led
him to England to study aeronautics. His scientific interests resulted
in research into the philosophical foundations of mathematics,
which, in turn, eventually led him to the English philosopher
Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. Russell was very impressed by
Wittgenstein and encouraged him to pursue his interests in
philosophy, prompting Wittgenstein to concentrate on investigations
into logic.8
Wittgenstein's work concerning logic was set forth in his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a work published with the assistance of
Russell and the only book by Wittgenstein that appeared during his
lifetime.89 The Tractatus constituted Wittgenstein's early phase in
which he regarded many, if not most, of the problems of philosophy
as bits of nonsense (perhaps better rendered "non-sense") to be
dissolved by the sort of logical reagents supplied by the propositions
contained in the Tractatus.90 Wittgenstein considered himself to be so
successful in this endeavor in the Tractatus that he abandoned
philosophy.9'
The Tractatus appeared in print in 1922. In 1929, however,
86

For a succinct discussion of the major features of Wittgenstein's departure

from his earlier philosophical positions by one of his most renown students, see
Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 334-37 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972); see also ROBERT J. FOGEUN,
WrrrGENSTEIN, 105-40 (2d ed. 1987). Anthony Kenny has persuasively argued that
the "earlier" and "later" phases of Wittgenstein's thought are not as discontinuous as
is often maintained. SeeANTHONYKENNY, WITrGENSTEIN 219-32 (1973).
87 See Georg H. von Wright, A BiographicalSketch, in LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN:
THE
MAN AND His PHILOSOPHY 15 (K.T. Fann ed., 1967); see also KENNY, supra note 86, at 12.
See von Wright, supra note 87, at 15-18.
See KENNY, supra note 86, at 3.
90 See von Wright, supra note 87, at 21; JOHN W. DANFORD, WITrGENSTEIN
AND
POLTCAL PHILOSOPHY: A REEXAMINATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 73-

74, 84-85 (1978); KENNY, supra note 86, at 6-8. As Wittgenstein states in Proposition
4.003 in the Tractatus.
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical
works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any
answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are
nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers
arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.
LUDWIG WrFrGENSTEIN, TIAcrATUs LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 4.003 (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness trans., 1961).
91 SeeKENNY, supra note 86, at
8.
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dissatisfied with aspects of the doctrines elaborated in the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge University to resume work in
philosophy, becoming a professor there in 1939.9
Wittgenstein
resigned his professorship in 1947, but continued to devote himself
to philosophic work. The PhilosophicalInvestigations, a work published
after his death 93 but probably completed by 1949, constituted the
major work of his later phase. 94
Wittgenstein intended the
Investigations and the Tractatus to be published as a single volume,
and for the Investigations to serve as both a critique of, and a
corrective to, the Tractatus.5 Where the Tractatus employs language
to craft a set of logical propositions that dissolved philosophical
puzzles, the Investigations presents a more nuanced and complicated
view of the nature and role of language and of the conceptual
framework that it articulates. The Investigations will serve as the basis
for this Article's examination of the nature of the conceptual
landscape associated with noticing a resemblance.
The Investigations is a puzzling philosophic work by its very
nature, which is, as Wittgenstein described, a series of "sketches" of
"criss-cross" explorations of philosophic "landscapes."96 As a result,
See id. at 12; von Wright, supra note 87, at 24.
Wittgenstein died on April 29, 1951. Seevon Wright, supra note
86, at 13.
H See id. at 24-25.
95 Wittgenstein makes this clear in the Preface to
the Investigations.
Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly
seemed to me that I should publish these old thoughts and the new
ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by
contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.
For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen
years ago, I have been forced to recognize many grave mistakes in what
I wrote in that first book.
WrTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at vi; see also FOGELIN, supra note 86, at 107-08. For a
general discussion of Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatusin the Investigations, see
id. at 107-144.
96 As Wittgenstein himself characterizes the Investigations
in his Preface:
The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of
philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last
sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning,
of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of
mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written
down all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of which there is
sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I
sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.
-It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose
form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing
was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a
natural order and without breaks.
92
93
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the organization of, and the relation between, the passages in the
Investigations is quite often obscure. This obscurity is evident in the
structure of the Investigations, which is divided into two parts, but
otherwise contains no headings or titles to distinguish and categorize
what appears to be a meandering and somewhat disjointed
discussion.97 Part I of the Investigations begins with a quotation from
St. Augustine's Confessions and consists of a series of generally fairly
short passages numbered from one to 693. Part II of the Investigations
contains a series of often relatively longer passages, numbered from I
to XIV. Despite the lack of clearly disclosed organization, a number
of topics and deliberations do emerge from the pages of the
98 One of those topics is Wittgenstein's discussion of
Investigations.
what has been termed "seeing as," or seeing an aspect of an object,

After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into
such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I
could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my
thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single
direction against their natural inclination. -And this was, of course,
connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels
us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.
-The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of
sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long
and involved journeyings.
The same or almost the same points were always being approached
afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of
these were badly drawn or uncharacteristic, marked by all of the defects
of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected a number of
tolerable ones were left, which now had to be arranged and sometimes
cut down, so that if you looked at them you could get a picture of the
landscape. Thus this book is really only an album.
WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at v.
97 See KENNy, supra note 86, at 13-14.
Fogelin describes the structure of the Investigations in the following manner.
As the Investigations continues, the connected chains of remarks
become shorter and the asides, interruptions and changes of subjects
more frequent. I don't point this out as a criticism, nor do I think that
this is what Wittgenstein had in mind when he says, "I should have
liked to produce a good book." Wittgenstein's method of exposition is
motivated by his conception of philosophy. A philosophical problem
arises from confusions, misunderstandings, but not usually in a simple
way. A particular philosophical problem can be the intersection of a
number of misunderstandings, and as one is removed the center of
gravity of the problem can shift to another. A philosophical perplexity,
like a neurosis, can be overdetermined in its causes, and because of this
Wittgenstein's digressions, anticipations, flashbacks, sudden shifts of
subject matter, etc., are not signs of the weakness of his method; on the
contrary, they exhibit his understanding of the character of
philosophical perplexities and the methods needed for resolving them.
FOGEUN, supranote 86, at 186.
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which is centered in the earlier portions of section XI of Part II of the
0
Investigations."
In this discussion, Wittgenstein explores the
conceptual nature of our ability to see aspects of objects, including
our ability to see the resemblance between objects."

goSeeWITrGENSTEIN,

supra note 2, at 195-216.

100 Although the discussion in this study is couched in terms of sight, which is the

modality that predominates in Wittgenstein's discussion, it need not be confined to
visual perception. Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as" also includes a number of
references to examples of perceiving aspects in connection with sound. For
example, Wittgenstein states: "I have a theme played to me several times and each
time in a slower tempo. In the end I say 'Now it's right', or 'Now at last it's a march',
'Now at last it's a dance'. -The same tone expresses the dawning of an aspect." Id.
at 206; see also id. at 209 (using minor and major chords and the recognition of a
"plaintive melody" as examples of aspects only accessible after a technique is
learned); id. at 214-16 (describing the inability to experience the meaning of a word
as being analogous to being "aspect-blind"; that is, unable to perceive an aspect of a
PARK,
that others do); see also BYONGCHUL
perceptual
impression
166-67 (1998)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ASPECrS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY
(discussing Wittgenstein's discussion of "aspect" as including both visual and audio
experiences). One could easily imagine expanding the discussion to include touch,
smell, and taste. See PAUL JOHNSTON, WrrTGENsTEIN: RETHINKING THE INNER 60-66
(1993). The extension to other modalities of perception is relevant to this discussion
simply because, in principle, trade dress can extend to any perceptible quality and
has included such qualities as a "registration process" for a trade fair and the
performing style of a rock music group. See I MCCARThY, supra note 3, § 8:4, at 8-11
to 8-14 (cataloguing a range of features, elements, and aspects of products and
services that have been afforded trade dress protection). In this regard, see generally
Nancy Rubner-Frandsen, Ambience, Subliminal Confusion, Color, Smell and Sound: The
Protection of Non-Verbal Rights Under the Trademark and Unfair Competition Law, C674
ALI-ABA 155 (1991).
It might be suggested that Wittgenstein's famous discussion of the commonality
underlying the term "game" might also be enlightening in connection with his
investigation of the conceptual landscape associated with the human ability to notice
resemblance. In section 66 of Part I of the Investigations,Wittgenstein anticipates an
objection to the notion of "language-games" that he had developed in preceding
sections. The objection is that, although Wittgenstein has identified a number of
language-games, he has not identified what makes all of these activities part of
language-in other words, he has not shown the common feature of languagegames. Wittgenstein's response is to raise the issue of whether there is something
shared that makes one thing-the example used here are those things termed
"games"-similar to another. However, as the excerpt below makes clear, in this
discussion Wittgenstein generally presupposes the visibility of such a resemblance,
rather than exploring the conceptual landscape associated with that visibility:
66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I
mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.
What is common to them all? -Don't say- "There must be something
common, or they would not be called 'games'"-but look and see
whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them
you will not see something that is common to al, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't
think, but lookl -Look for example at board-games, with their
multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find
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In his exploration of "seeing as" and in the Investigations as a
whole, Wittgenstein set for himself the task of investigating the
concepts associated with certain human activities and abilities.""'
Specifically, with regard to his discussion of "seeing as," Wittgenstein
was concerned with developing a conceptual account of the human
ability to perceive objects as more than simple perceptual givens. But
what does it mean to provide a conceptual account of such an
activity?
many correspondences with the first group, but many common
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ballgames,
much that is common is retained, but much is losL -Are they all
,amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there
always winning and losing, or competition between prayers? Think of
patience. In ball games there is winning and losing;, but when a child
throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has
disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the
difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of
games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but
how many other characteristic features have disappearedl And we can
go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way;
can see how similarities crop up and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall
similarities, sometimes similarities in detail.
67. I can think of no better expression to describe these similarities
than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament,
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. -And I shall say:
'games' form a family.
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same
way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it
has a-direct-relationship with several things that have hitherto been
called number, and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to
other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of
number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the
strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre
runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all
these constructions-namely the disjunction of all their common
properties"-I should reply: Now you are only playing with words.
One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole threadnamely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".
WrrrGENSTUN, supranote 2, §§ 66-67, at 31-32.
101Many of Wittgenstein's efforts may be characterized in this regard as
phenomenological in nature. For an interesting treatment of Wittgenstein's work
from that perspective, see generally BYONG-CHUL PARK, supra note 100. For purposes
of this study, however, the question of whether, or in what sense, if any, Wittgenstein
was engaged in phenomenological explorations is irrelevant to an examination of
the conceptual results of his philosophical activity in the Investigations. On the other
hand, Park's discussion of Wittgenstein's exploration of "seeing as" is often
insightful. See id. at 162-78.
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As Stanley Rosen elucidates in his discussion of the development
of the term "concept," in the contemporary sense, a conceptual
analysis consists of the construction of a technical description of
preconceptual activity:
Stated with extreme brevity, since there is no noetic vision of the
form, we must constructively grasp that from sensation and
account for it in the categories of discursive thinking. After Kant,
the cognitive content of intuition is transformed into a pure
intellectual intuition that sees, not objects, but itself. This,
however, does not change the basic situation with respect to
objects, which come more and more to be known through
construction.
In the characteristic maxim of the modem period, we know only
what we make .... In the extreme Kantian formulation, we grasp
something by our various cognitive faculties, but we cannot see it
as it is in itself... As a result, we think the constituted concept,
not the thing itself. The object is the project of the thinking

subject.
It is the necessary background for our immediate goal of
understanding the contemporary use of the term concept. A
concept is a mental entity, intuited or constructed, expressing a
determinate content of discursively accessible thought. It gives us
security over what we think in a way analogous to the security we
derive from the object that is gripped by the hand. This concept
may be a function in the Fregean sense, or it may be a nonmathematical "idea" corresponding to any possible cognizable
aspect of experience. In the former case the concept must have
sharp delimitation or a truth-value for every argument. In the
latter case the necessary sharpness of the concept is a matter of
dispute, but this much can be safely said: the analysis of a concept
turns upon the determining of its structural properties. Giving an
account is thus also a counting, not merely in the sense of
identifying graspable units of a graspable structure but also
because, even in the case of "inexact" concepts, the paradigm
continues to be the precision of mathematics. In my opinion, this
is also true for much ordinary-language philosophy, namely, that
part which follows the program of replacing initial intuitions and
the imprecision of ordinary discourse with the exact distinctions
of a technical terminology or a constructed theory designed to
remove the ambiguities of the pre-analytical situation. 02
With respect to this Article's examination of Wittgenstein's
102 ROSEN, THE LIMIrS OF ANALYSIS, supa note 10, at 44-45. As indicated by the
title, Rosen's work constitutes a profound, sustained, and extensive consideration of
the preconditions and limitations of conceptual analysis.
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discussion of "seeing as," then, the task that Wittgenstein sets for
himself can be defined as the construction of a conceptual account of
the preconceptual activity of seeing aspects of things.'03 To restate
this conclusion in more metaphorical terms, the task is to discern and
then to "grasp" intellectually the activity of "seeing as.,'04
While the structure of the discussion of "seeing as" in the
Investigations is as obscure and convoluted as the Investigations as a
whole, certain topics and arguments are evident. To begin with,
Wittgenstein makes his intentions clear from the very outset of
Section XI of Part II, which begins as follows:
Two uses of the word "see".
The one: "What do you see there?'-"I see this" (and then a
description, a drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a likeness
between these two faces"-let the man I tell this to be seeing the
faces as clearly as I do myself.

The importance of this is the difference of category between the
two 'objects' of sight.
The one man might make an accurate drawing of the two faces,
and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the former
did not see.
I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to
another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently.

1 The "problem" of accounting for vision in a philosophic sense would not be
"solved" by the development of an exhaustive description of the chemical and
biological mechanisms that give rise to the human ability to see. As a result, as Paul
Johnston notes, the sort of conceptual analysis that Wittgenstein undertakes is not
displaced by scientific explanation:
It would be wrong, however, to think that science might provide the
solution to our difficulties. The problem in trying to understand both
consciousness and vision is not that we lack information, but that we
cannot organise the information we already possess. . . . Further
scientific discoveries about what happens when we see may explain
various aspects of our visual ability (e.g. why certain illusions fool us
and others don't), but they cannot tell us anything about our visual
experience itself, for ex hypothesi what we do not already know cannot
be part of our experience. For example, the fact that the retinal image
is upside down does not show that what we really see are upside-down

images, for, whatever the mechanics of the eye, our experience is of a

world right way up. Thus the scientific and conceptual tasks are
distinct. The philosophical problem centres on the concept of seeing
and on the paradox that we use this concept and yet cannot give a
coherent account of it.
JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 37.
104 As observed by Garth Hallett, Wittgenstein's discussion
of "seeing as" is also
connected to earlier themes in the Tractatus. See GARTH HALLETr, A COMPANION TO
WITTGENS'rEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONs 662-63 (1977).
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I call this experience of "noticing an aspect."
Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
We are interested in the concept and its place among the
concepts of experience.'°5
As the very first sentence of this passage indicates, Wittgenstein
is concerned with the fundamental distinction, in terms of their
conceptual nature, between two senses of the verb "see."
Wittgenstein then notes the fact that, upon scrutiny, what appears to
be a simple, transparent, and entirely commonplace activity
comprehended by the single term "see" is, in fact, a much richer and
more complicated activity. Wittgenstein uncovers this complexity
first by pointing out that, in the broadest sense, "see" can be used to
refer to two distinct activities, which are, conceptually, categorically
different: The first sense of the term refers to situations in which
what is "seen" is simply perceived as a perceptual given; the second
sense of the term refers to situations in which what is "seen" is
noticed as a part or aspect of what is perceptually given.
Even as he identifies the difference between the uses of the term
"see," Wittgenstein makes it clear that he is concerned with providing
a conceptual account of such a difference, and for that reason his
discussion concerns "the concept and its place among the concepts of
experience. " '06 Wittgenstein's statement that the "causes" of such a
difference is a matter for psychologists indicates that his interest is
not in what gives rise to the categorical difference, but, rather, in
discerning and grasping the conceptual nature of that categorical
0 7
difference.!
Lastly, it should be noted that the illustration used by
Wittgenstein to epitomize "noticing an aspect"-of "seeing as"-is
seeing a resemblance.
That is, Wittgenstein's first paradigmatic
instance of "seeing as" is the ability to see not merely the object
before one, but also to somehow see that the object being viewed
resembles another.
Wittgenstein continues the introduction of his topic by
providing a graphic that illustrates the matter he intends to
supra note 2, at 193. For discussion of these crucial opening
passages, see FOGEON, supra note 86, at 201-02; JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 37-38;
HALLE'r, supra note 104, at 662-63.
10 W
GENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 193.
107 In a number of other places Wittgenstein makes clear his interest in the
concepts associated with "seeing as," not in its causes: "Here we are not asking
ourselves what are the causes and what produces this impression in a particular case."
WrrrGENSTFN, supra note 2, at 201. "Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual
one." Id. at 203.
105 WITrGENSTEIN,
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investigate:
You could imagine the illustration

appearing in several places in a book, a text-book for instance. In the
relevant text something different is in question every time: here a
glass cube, there is an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that
shape, there three board forming a solid angle. Each time the text
supplies the interpretation of the illustration.
But we can also see the illustration now as one thing now as
another. -- So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.
In this portion of the text, Wittgenstein illustrates the human
ability to see objects in different ways; that is, not only as the objects
themselves, but also as their aspects. Wittgenstein thus illustrates the
various ways that one in the same visual impression can appear.' °9 For
approximately the next twenty-four pages, Wittgenstein concentrates
on exploring the concepts that are associated with this ability. To
accomplish this task, as is indicated by the initial passage,
Wittgenstein proceeds to draw a categorical conceptual distinction
between "seeing" and "seeing as."" 0
The first step in coming to grips with Wittgenstein's discussion
of "seeing as" is briefly to consider the first side of the conceptual
108 Id. at 193.
109 To somewhat anticipate the discussion, perhaps the most prominent
example
of this strange ability to perceive aspects is evident in a "change of aspect": situations
in which our perception of an actually unchanging visual impression is transformed,
and we recognize the change. A good representative situation is one in which a
resemblance between one object and another is suddenly remarked, when no such
resemblance had been remarked earlier: neither object is changed, but they both
are suddenly seen in quite a different way. The sometimes queer effects of such a
recognition are illustrated by the quotation from the Pensees, supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
n1 As has been illustrated, Wittgenstein originally refers to the ability to see
perspectives or aspects as "noticing an aspect." His later repetition of the phrase "see
it as" has led Fogelin and a number of other scholars to title Wittgenstein's
discussion of these related topics as "seeing as." FOGEUN, supra note 86, at 201.
Fogelin's denomination of the ability to see aspects as "seeing as" is followed in this
discussion. On the significance of Wittgenstein's use of the term "aspect," see BYONGCHUL PARK, supra note 100, at 163-64.
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categorization he explores, and so to examine his discussion of
"seeing." As Wittgenstein makes clear, he considers "seeing" a state. 11'
Wittgenstein characterizes "seeing" as a "state" in connection with his
discussion of the nature of the perceptions that are presented when
different aspects of a thing are seen: "Do I really see something
different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different

way? I am inclined to say the former. But why? - To interpret is to
think, to do something; seeing is a state.""'
For Wittgenstein, then, because "seeing" is simply a perceptual
state, when one sees, he sees things as the things that we see. 1
Wittgenstein's position on what inferences one can draw from his
perceptions or reports of those perceptions is based upon the uses
that we make of such experiences and articulations, not on
epistemological and ontological hypotheses."4 So, Wittgenstein
points out, "One doesn't 'take' what one knows as the cutlery at a
meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to move one's
mouth as one eats, or aims at moving it."" 5 By this statement,
Wittgenstein intends to illustrate the way one normally sees things.
For instance, one might see a mirror or might see his reflection in a
mirror. In each instance, one "sees" a mirror or himself, although in
one case our visual impression is 'direct,' in the sense of not being
mediated, as in the second case, in which the image of one's self is
being seen 'through' the glass of the mirror. This occurs even
though we might be tempted, at times, to spin epistemological,
M Wittgenstein also considers expectation, having an opinion, hoping
for

something, knowledge of something, and having the ability to do something as
"states." See WrITGENSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 572-573, at 151; see aisoJoHNsTON, supra
note 100, at 42-43.
112 WrTGENST.IN,

supra note 2, at 212.

See HALLETr, supra note 104, at 665-66. Wittgenstein's conception of "seeing"
does not constitute naive Realism-a claim that both the existence and the content
of our perceptions are as they are because they are grounded in things that actually
exist-but an assertion that, when we are "seeing," we take our visual impressions at
what might be called their face value. See FOGEULN, supranote 86, at 202-03.
14
With regard to the inferences to be drawn from sense data,
Wittgenstein notes:
486. Does it follow from the sense-impressions which get that there
is a chair over there? - How can a proposition follow from senseimpressions? Well, does it follow from the propositions which describe
the sense-impressions? No. - But don't I infer that a chair is there
from the impressions, from sense-data? - I make no inferencel - and
yet I sometimes do. I see a photograph for example, and say "There
must have been a chair over there" or again "From what I can see here
I infer that there is a chair over there." That is an inference; but not
one belonging to logic.
11

WrrGENSTEIN, supranote
"1 Id. at 195.

2, § 486, at 136.

2000]

THE TANGLED LANDSCAPE OFRESEMBLANCE

793

ontological, metaphysical, or other sorts of theories and explanations
to "account" for these experiences.
When we report our visual perceptions, therefore, it is usually an
extraordinary visual perception or the request for an extraordinary
account that will cause us to speak of those perceptions in terms of
their being constituted of, for instance, certain shapes and colors. All
of which is to say that we do not ordinarily resolve our perceptions
into their perceptible qualities. In fact, in those instances when we
do report what we see as simply being perceptible qualities, it seems
as if we are almost always describing visual impressions that appear to
us as perceptible qualities. Such situations might occur, for example,
when we describe to a doctor the visual sensations accompanying
illness ("I saw flashing lights before the headache occurred"), or
when we confront an abstract painting in
6 which we do not recognize
figures, but see only shapes and colors."
In contrast to "seeing," which constitutes a state, Wittgenstein
makes clear that the ability to perceive aspects of what is experienced
while "seeing"-"seeing as"-is something more than a mere state."7
1
Wittgenstein makes this same point in a less direct, but perhaps more apposite
way, in Part I of the Investigations.
402. "It's true I say 'Now I am having such-and-such an image', but
the words 'I am having' are merely a sign to someone else, the
description of the image is a complete account of the imagined world."
-You
mean: the words "I am having" are like "I sayl ... ." You are
inclined to say it should really have been expressed differently.
Perhaps simply by making a sign with one's hand and then giving a
description. - When as in this case, we disapprove of the expressions
of ordinary language (which are after all performing their office), we
have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our
ordinary way of speaking. Whereas we are tempted to say that our way
of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for
example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other
way than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression
were saying something false even when the proposition faute de mieux
asserted something true.
For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists
look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if
they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were
stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being.
Id. § 402, at 121-22.
117 As one commentator characterizes the contrast
here:
[Wittgenstein] introduces the topic by noting that, if someone is asked
what she sees, her response can be of two kinds. On the one hand, she
may simply say 'I see this' and offer a description, drawing or copy to
illustrate what she sees. On the other hand, she may say 'I see a
likeness between these two faces' and in this case there will be no
drawing that corresponds to the likeness, nor will she necessarily be
able to offer a further description.
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For Wittgenstein, "seeing as" is distinguished from "seeing" in that
"seeing as" describes the human ability to experience the aspects of
the visual impressions that "seeing" simply "sees."' Because "seeing
as" describes the experience of a perception, Wittgenstein notes that
"seeing as" entails no change in perception and is not a part of
perception."9
To illustrate this point, Wittgenstein makes use of the famous
figure of the "duck-rabbit," which he notes that he derived from
Jastrow:i2

With respect to this figure, Wittgenstein points out the puzzling fact
that, while clearly the object being seen does not in any way undergo
transformation (i.e., the image of the duck-rabbit undergoes no
change), "what" is seen can change radically (one can see the figure
as simply a set of2 curves, as the silhouette of a rabbit, as the silhouette
of a duck, etc.):

1

The change of aspect. "But surely you would say that the
picture is altogether different now!"
But what is different: my impression? my point of view? -- Can
I say?

I describe the alteration like a perception; quite as if the

object had altered before my eyes.
"Now I am seeing this", I might say (pointing to another picture,
for example). This has the form of a report of a new perception.
The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new
perception and at the same time of the perception's being

unchanged.
If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and

JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 37-38.
118 See FOGELIN, supra note 86, at 201.
119 SeeWrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 196-97.
12

121

See id. at 194.

In connection with the Jastrow figure, Wittgenstein also notes that there is a

conceptual distinction between simply viewing such an aspect and the arising of an
awareness of that aspect: "And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of
an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect." Id. at 194.
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colours (I give them in detail) - and I saw besides something like
this: and here I point to a number of different pictures of rabbits.
-This
shews the difference between the concepts.
'Seeing as ....

.' is

not part of perception. And for that reason it

is like seeing and again not like.
To this point, it hardly seems controversial to admit that
Wittgenstein has identified two related, but clearly conceptually
distinct, human abilities, "seeing" simpliciter and "seeing as." Further,
he has clearly-and properly-categorized the ability to perceive
resemblance as one sort of "seeing as." But the further attempt to
refine our conceptual grasp of our ability to engage in "seeing as"
proves thorny. Wittgenstein's further discussion makes one thing
clear: The conceptual landscape involved in "seeing as" is extremely
complicated, replete with fine shadings and interrelations, and,
therefore, hard to clearly delineate and resolve.
In exploring the conceptual landscape of "seeing as,"
Wittgenstein considers and rejects a number of conceptualizations
that seek to explain or account for "seeing as" or aspects of "seeing
as." In each of these cases, Wittgenstein's rejection is based upon the
fact that such conceptualizations, in effect, underdetermine or
overdetermine the activity. That is, Wittgenstein's examination of
these conceptualizations shows that they are in some way too simple
or incomplete and that their lack of complexity and nuance results in
their inability to do conceptual justice to the activity they seek to
grasp. For instance, Wittgenstein notes that we might be tempted to
simply conceptualize "seeing as" as interpretive in nature; that is,
"seeing as" can be seen merely as a mental act by which we somehow
"construe" an object in a certain manner. Wittgenstein provides the
following characterization of "seeing as" as interpreting:
You can think now of this now of this as you look at it, can regard
it now as this now as this, and then you will see it now this way,

now this." -What way? There is no further qualification.'
Putting to one side rather obvious philosophical questions
attendant to the notion of mental acts that serve to construe an
object,'24 Wittgenstein himself immediately points out that
characterizing "seeing as" simply as "interpreting" hardly provides an
12

Id. at 195-97.

Id. at 200. Hallett provides the following gloss: "[S]eeing-as is not a parallel
component of perception, contributing organization to the total picture while seeing
provides the color and the lines." HALLETr, supra note 104, at 677.
124 For some of the philosophical problems attached to the notion of
mental acts
that serve to construe objects, see ROSEN, THE Imrrs, supranote 10, at 3-97.
1
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adequate conceptual account of the phenomenon. This is because it
would seem that interpretation would require doing some sort of
"violence" to the perception by willfully forcing it to conform to a
given interpretation being imposed upon it:
But how is it possible to see an object according to an interpretation?
- The question represents it as a queer fact; as if something were
being forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no
forcing took place here.1
Moreover, as Wittgenstein notes early on in the discussion, it is a
simple, if rather puzzling, fact that we experience "seeing as" not as
"interpreting" an object; rather, we actually see that object as
"interpreted": "But we can also see the illustration now as one 1thing
now as another. ---So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it." 2
Wittgenstein also considers and rejects an explanation of
"seeing as" that holds that there is an "inner picture" of the object
being perceived and that the variation of that inner picture accounts
for the shift in aspects experienced as "seeing as."'2
Such an
explanation certainly seems to account for one of the most
paradoxical aspects of "seeing as," which is that in "seeing as" there
appears to be both a change (the appearance of a now noticed
aspect) and at the same time no change in the perception (the
persistence of the original and unchanged object).2' Wittgenstein,
however, demonstrates that such an explanation is much too simple
to do justice to the complexity of "seeing as" for a number of reasons.
One reason is that its lack of complexity and nuance renders it, at
best, only a partial account of what might be termed the complex
"mechanism" of "seeing as." The presence of an inner picture might
explain how it is that something new is seen in "seeing as" (i.e., the
"new" inner picture constitutes the newly recognized aspect). This
explanation, however, cannot account for how that same object is
12

WITTGENSTEIN,

1

supra note 2, at 200.
Id. at 193; see alsoJOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 38-40. AsJohnston frames the

point:
The essence of this latter phenomenon [suddenly noticing an aspect]
is that the individual has a new visual impression despite the object
before her remaining unchanged. It is tempting therefore to claim
that what changes is the individual's interpretation of her experience,
but this suggestion won't work, for the grammar of seeing as is quite
different from that of interpreting.
Id. at 3940.
'2 "Inner picture" means an intellectual object such as those that must be posited
in Idealistic philosophical positions, such as that taken by Bishop Berkeley. See
JOHNSTON,
supra note 100, at 34-36, 51-52.
128 See

id. at 41.
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seen, simultaneously, as not having changed at all (i.e., how the "new"
inner picture is, at the same time, recognized as the "original" inner
picture) .12
Another objection Wittgenstein makes to conceptualizing
"seeing as" as simply the product of possessing some sort of inner
picture is that such an account is, logically, internally contradictory,
because the inner picture must simultaneously represent the original
and the changed image both as the original and as the changed
image.'s9 Further, Wittgenstein notes that "seeing as" cannot be
conceptualized as simply reconstituting various shapes and colors to
form various inner pictures because such an account does not
adequately correspond to the stability and "transparency" of the
multitudinous visual perceptions actually perceived. Rather, such a
simplistic account distorts the nature of our experience of our
perceptions, which are not perceived as simply "shifting" visual grist
for our perceptual mill, but as definite and stable visual
impressions."

Wittgenstein makes these points as follows:
Above all do not say "After all my visual impression isn't the
drawing, it is this-which I can't shew to anyone." -- Of course it is
not the drawing, but neither is it anything of the same category,

which I carry within myself.
The concept of the 'inner picture' is misleading, for this
concept uses the 'outer picture' as a model; and yet the uses of the
words for these concepts are no more like one another than the
uses of 'numeral' and 'number'. (And if one chose to call
numbers 'ideal numbers', one might produce a similar
confusion.)
If you put the 'organization' of a visual impression on a level
with colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the
visual impression as an inner object. Of course this makes this
object into a chimera; a queerly shifting construction. For the
similarity to a picture is now impaired.'3 '
In the course of his discussion, Wittgenstein considers and
129
130

See id.
This contradiction is described byJohnston as follows:
In fact the demands being made on it [the inner picture theory] are
contradictory, for the picture before the change [in aspects] must
differ from the picture after and yet both must correspond to the
original drawing.

Id.

1

See id. at 34-37, 41-42.

1

WrrrGENSTMN,

supra note 2, at 196.
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rejects other conceptualizations of "seeing as" that are incomplete,
too simplistic, or incoherent.'" Wittgenstein himself never offers a
general conceptual account of "seeing as." Instead, his often
convoluted and tortuous investigation is oriented toward looking over
and charting portions of the puzzling and complex landscape that he
seeks to explore.'3' It is not appropriate, nor is it necessary, for
purposes of this Article, to follow the windings and turnings of the
daedalian maze formed by Wittgenstein's discussion'3 5 to establish two
propositions that a broad consideration of Wittgenstein's discussion
makes clear. First, the concepts involved in "seeing as" are so
numerous, enormously complicated, and often entail such fine
gradations and nuances that they are very difficult properly to
identify and delineate. Second, the concepts associated with the
ability to experience resemblance-the experiential foundation for a
likelihood of confusion-are themselves inextricably and intricately

1
For example, Wittgenstein considers whether "seeing as" represents simply an
"incomplete description"-a selective account-of a visual impression. See id. at 199.
Wittgenstein also considers whether such visual impressions merely correspond to
some sort of "materialization." See id. at 199-200. Finally, Wittgenstein considers
whether "seeing as" represents only accounts of the possible states of the objects
perceived. See id. at 200-01.
13 The lack of such a general conceptual account of "seeing
as" is consistent with
Wittgenstein's overall philosophic project, which is not to create grand conceptual
structures, but to clear away simplistic, incoherent, and inadequate conceptual
accounts and misconceptions in favor of a careful and meticulous examination. As
Wittgenstein makes clear, he is interested in revealing the conceptual landscape by
clearing away false accounts, not in substituting an exhaustive conceptual account for
actual practice:
Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions.
-It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material
object in terms of 'what is really seen'. -What we have rather to do is
to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the
matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are
taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be
rejected.
Id. at 200. For a further consideration of the relation between Wittgenstein's
philosophic interests and his methods and results in connection with his discussion
of "seeing as," see infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the
philosophical approach of Wittgenstein).
1
With respect to the complicated and meandering nature of Wittgenstein's
discussion, one of the most capable, concise, and clear-eyed commentators on
Wittgenstein introduces an analysis of the passages dealing with "seeing as" in the
following manner "Part II of the Investigations contains a famous (and perplexing)
discussion of the phenomenon of changing aspects." FOGEUN, supra note 86, at 201.
Fogelin also notes that there is "something deeply unsatisfying" about the seemingly
arbitrary way in which Wittgenstein's conceptual analysis of "seeing as" trails off in
places. See id. at 206. On the other hand, Fogelin also observes that such results are
not inconsistent with Wittgenstein's account of "family resemblances." Id. at 205.
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embedded in the fantastically Byzantine web of concepts involved in
"seeing as."
The first point-the myriad nature and complexity of the
concepts involved in "seeing as's-is not only exhibited by the very
labyrinthine structure and content of Wittgenstein's exposition, but is
expressly acknowledged by Wittgenstein in a number of contexts. For
instance, Wittgenstein underscores the great number of different and
interrelated concepts involved in the complicated experience of
noticing aspects from a visual perception. This experience is evident
when we see a figure first as one thing, then as another, based upon
some portion of the figure. Needless to say, such an experience is
often present in, and is many times the basis of, noticing that one
object resembles another due to the similarity of aspects that become
apparent. As Wittgenstein observes:
Imagine a duck-rabbit hidden in a tangle of lines. Now I
suddenly notice it in the picture, and notice it simply as the head
of a rabbit. At some later time I look at the same picture and
notice the same figure, but see it as the duck, without necessarily
realizing that it was the same figure both times. -If I later see
the aspect change--can I say that the duck and rabbit aspects are
now seen quite differently from when I recognized them
separately in the tangle of lines? No.
But the change produces a surprise not produced by the
recognition.
If you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then
find it, you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind
of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new
visual experience.
But you would not necessarily want to say "Figure (1) looks
quite different now; it isn't even in the least like the figure I saw
before, though they are congruent!"
There are here hugely many interrelated phenomena and
possible concepts.6
Later in the text, Wittgenstein stresses the necessarily intricate

nature of any concept dealing with seeing.3 7 The intricacy is due, at
the least, as Wittgenstein points out, to the very nature of seeing,
which involves the vagaries of perceptual activity with its "tangled"
136 WrrrGENSTEIN,

supra note 2, at 199.
Wittgenstein's comments in regard to the intricate nature of "seeing," which,
given the presence only of apostrophes and not quotation marks surrounding the
term, clarifies that he is referring to all aspects of visual activity, including both
"seeing" and "seeing as."
137
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uptake of visual impressions. Additionally, Wittgenstein observes that
this complexity is increased because there is a vast range of possible
descriptions of that uptake, depending upon the purposes,
intentions, or requirements that guide or dictate any particular
description of the things seen:
The concept of 'seeing' makes a tangled impression. Well, it is
tangled. -I look at the landscape, my gaze ranges over it, I see
all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; this impresses itself
sharply on me, that is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged
what we see can appear And now look at all that can be meant by
"description of what is seen". -But this just is what is called
description of what is seen. There is not one genuine proper case
of such description-the rest being just vague, something which
awaits clarification, or which must be swept aside as rubbish.
At another point, Wittgenstein notes the tremendous variety of
concepts involved in a conceptual exploration of the human ability
willfully to see an object in different ways. Wittgenstein provides the
following illustration of this ability: Although presented with a figure
that portrays a triangle resting on its hypotenuse, a person can
willfully see it rather as hanging from its apex or resting upon its
base.' 9 Even as he discusses this ability, Wittgenstein notes the
puzzling fact that, in contrast, it is also the case that certain objects
are not generally subject to being willfully viewed in other ways, such
as drawings that are "always" seen having a certain sort of
dimensionality.' 4 The complexity of the concepts associated with
these phenomena leads Wittgenstein to note the seemingly
interminable nature of the conceptual account:
Certain drawings are always seen as flat figures, and others
sometimes, or always, three-dimensionally.
Here one would now like to say: the visual impression of what is
seen three-dimensionally is three dimensional; with the schematic
cube, for instance, it is a cube. (For the description of the
impression is the description of the cube.)
And then it seems queer that with some drawings our
impression should be a flat thing, and with some a threedimensional
thing. One asks oneself "Where is this going to
4
end? ' '

138 WrrGENSTEIN,
'3

supra note 2, at

See id. at 200-01.

200.

40 See GARTH HALLETT, WrGrrENSMIN's DEFINITION OF MEANING As USE
60-61

(1967).
141

WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note

2, at 202.
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Wittgenstein also expressly marks the complex interrelation of
concepts present in describing aspects of "seeing as" in connection
with his discussion of the experience of "being struck" by aspects of a
perceptual impression. The phenomenon Wittgenstein explores
here is the way that an aspect can strike with special force and then,
for some reason, either persist as such, or reappear or recede,
sometimes even into being unnoticed.
Wittgenstein gives the
example of perceiving a resemblance:
"Iobserved the likeness between him and his father for a few
minutes, and then no longer." -One might say this if his face
were changing and only looked like his father's for a short time.
But it can also mean that after a few minutes I stopped being
struck by the likeness.
"After the likeness had struck you, how long were you aware of it?"
What kind of answer might one give to this question? -"I soon
stopped thinking about it", or "It struck me again from time to
time", or "Iseveral times had the thought, how like they are!", or
"I marvelled at the likeness for at least a minute" -That is the
sort of answer you would get.4
In considering the concepts that correspond to this experience,
Wittgenstein, on the one hand, rejects the notion that the experience
of "being struck" by an aspect is both a perceptual and an intellectual
act because there does not seem to be an intellectual component to
the phenomenon, and, on the other, notes that the many related
concepts involved in such an experience intersect: "Is being struck
looking plus thinking? No. Many of our concepts cross here."14
To sum up then, Wittgenstein's discussion as a whole, along with
a number of his explicit pronouncements, makes it clear that any
conceptual account of "seeing as" involves, as Wittgenstein states, "....
hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible concepts."'" It is
the intricate, interrelated, paradoxical, and hard-to-refine nature of
the conceptual landscape here that prompts Wittgenstein's
observation that "[w]e find certain things about seeing puzzling,
because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling
14 5
enough."

142
143

144

Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 212.

As stated by Stanley Rosen, a large measure of Wittgenstein's
puzzlement here can be attributed to a misguided attempt to submit the
preconceptual preconditions of conceptual analysis to conceptual analysis. ROSEN,
THE LIMrrs, supra note 10, at 3-97, 216-60.
14
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Beyond the fact that the conceptual landscape associated with
"seeing as" is indelibly complex and difficult to resolve, it is also the
case that the experience of noticing a resemblance-the conceptual
foundation of the existence of a likelihood of confusion-is
embedded in multifarious and complex ways in the anfractuous
landscape that constitutes "seeing as." This is made clear from the
number of different contexts within Wittgenstein's discussion of
"seeing as" in which noticing a resemblance appears.'4 6 To begin
with, as noted previously, Wittgenstein uses noticing a resemblance as
the initial, and so paradigmatic, example of "seeing as.",47
Additionally, Wittgenstein utilizes noticing a resemblance to
refine the conceptual distinctions present in his discussion of
situations in which a person suddenly recognizes an object that is in
some other respect already quite familiar.'"
In this context,
Wittgenstein observes that noticing a resemblance in some contexts
presents a queer conceptual complexity, insofar as it seems to fall at
the intersection of thinking and seeing!"
146 The following discussion of noticing a resemblance
is confined to those
portions of Wittgenstein's exploration of "seeing as" in which he is most clearly
focusing strictly on the concepts associated with the ability to see the resemblance
between one thing and another. There are many places in his discussion in which
Wittgenstein makes use of the ability to notice a resemblance ancillary to his
discussion of other aspects of "seeing as." For example, in discussing the flashing of
an aspect and in providing an illustration of what it would be to be "aspect-blind." See
WrrrGENSTEN, supra note 2,at 197-98, 213-14.
147 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the initial
passages of Part II, Section XI, of the Investigations.
148 Wittgenstein's text illustrates such a situation as follows:
"I meet someone
whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly, but fail to know him. Suddenly I
know him, I see the old face in the altered one. I believe that I should do a different
portrait of him now if I could paint." WrlTGENSTEN, supra note 2, at 197.
149 Wittgenstein's description of recognizing a
face in a crowd illustrates how
noticing a resemblance seems to combine both thinking and seeing:
Now, when I know my acquaintance in a crowd, perhaps after
looking in his direction for quite a while, -is this a special sort of
seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or an amalgam, of the
two, as I should almost like to say?
The question is: why does one want to say this?
Id. at 197. In discussing this point, one commentator notes how the phenomenon of
recognition illustrates the "looseness" (seemingly the indeterminate and,
consequently, conceptually slippery nature) of the concept of seeing:
Take the example of someone recognizing an acquaintance in a crowd,
perhaps after looking in her direction for some time. In Wittgenstein's
words, 'Is this a special sort of seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and
thinking? Or an amalgam of the two as I should almost like to say?' In
a flash of recognition what we see changes-an anonymous crowd
suddenly becomes an old friend surrounded by people. We have a new
experience and one which is simultaneously a new visual experience
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Wittgenstein also makes use of noticing a resemblance in
exploring the concepts related to the duration of noticing an
aspect."'° In this portion of his discussion of "seeing as," Wittgenstein
makes it clear again that noticing a resemblance involves a peculiarly
complex relation of concepts in connection with the strength and
duration of such an experience.
In sum, the portions of Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as"
that focus on the concepts associated with noticing a resemblance
reveal that the human abilities and activities involved in that capacity
are diverse and wide-ranging and, therefore, are lodged in
multifarious and intricate ways in the overall conceptual landscape he
limns. Therefore, rather than being able to carve out a neat and
clear conceptual basis for distinguishing noticing a resemblance
simpliciter, it is evident that noticing a resemblance is inextricably
bound up in at least as much conceptual complexity as any other
aspect of "seeing as."
The task that Wittgenstein sets for himself in his discussion of
"seeing as" is to explore at the conceptual level the human ability to
perceive objects as more than simple perceptual givens. Because one
very significant type of "seeing as" is noticing a resemblance, his effort
also entails an attempt to investigate the concepts involved in the
human ability to see resemblance. As the above account has sought
to show, Wittgenstein's analysis is undertaken at a very fundamental
level and is subtle, nuanced, and often painstaking. Having said all
that, however, the analysis also discloses a conceptual landscape
composed of an extraordinarily large number of concepts, which
often intersect with such fine convolutions and which often involve
such intricate reticulations that a coherent and comprehensive
conceptual delineation seems unattainable. Given his own avowed
methods and interests, the problematic nature of the results of his
inquiry does not count as an objection, per se, to Wittgenstein's
efforts.'5 ' At the same time, however, these results do point to a
and a thought ('That's N'). The two aspects of the experience cannot
be separated from each other and therefore the attempt to isolate a
purely visual component of the experience makes no sense....
The example of recognition brings out the importance of the
individual's representation of what she saw, and this helps to explain
the looseness of the concept of seeing, for what this reflects is the
elasticity of the notion of a representation.
JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 49-50.
150 See supra note
141 and accompanying text (discussing the duration of the
perception of an aspect).

For a succinct and sympathetic consideration of Wittgenstein's philosophical
approach, methods, and results, see FOGEUN, supra note 86, passim 186, 205-10, 226-
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sobering fact concerning our ability to conceptually comprehend
resemblance: that a satisfactory conceptual account of our ability to
perceive resemblance appears, in principle, unrealizable.
CONCLUSION

The experience of noting a close and definite resemblance-the
basis for the existence of a likelihood of confusion-involving such
diverse perceptual impressions as the overall appearance of a
faucet,' the distinctive shape of a candy,"" or even something as
complex as the overall look of a restaurant'e " is an everyday
occurrence. By means of its examination of the Investigations, this
Article has sought to demonstrate that the mundane quality of this
experience veils a congeries of extremely complicated, profound, and
puzzling human abilities and activities. A philosopher, such as
Wittgenstein, who seeks to chart at a fundamental level the
conceptual landscape associated with these abilities and activities,
finds himself in a conceptual terrain in which seemingly endless
distinctions must be drawn and in which "hugely many interrelated
phenomena and possible concepts" reside."' This study has argued
that the conceptual landscape disclosed by Wittgenstein's exploration
of "seeing as," within which is embedded the capacity to notice a
resemblance, is so rich, complicated, variegated, and interrelated as
not to be susceptible to comprehensive conceptual analysis.
In the course of a carefully documented discussion of the
troublesome and unwieldy nature of the multifactor tests for
likelihood of confusion, a leading commentator has provided the
following hopeful exhortation in connection with the development of
such tests:
Law requires predictability; trademark cases are unpredictable.
The multifactor test does not necessarily make the outcome of a
case more predictable. It does settle the general pattern of proof
and argument, and it makes the decision process more uniform
and predictable.
The steady application of Polaroid is critical to the proper
34.
152

See generally Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993). At the state

level, even the performance style of a musical group may be protected under trade
dress doctrine. Seegenerally Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1987).
1 See generally Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Conusea Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1287,
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (regarding the shape of "Lifesavers" candy).
154 See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). See also
Davis,Jr., supranote 25, at 598 n.16 (citing cases involving restaurant trade dress).
Wittgenstein, supra note 2, at 199.
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development of trademark law, for it is only when the Polaroid
factors are applied consistently and clearly over time that the
relevant distinctions between different factual configurations can
emerge. Litigants are entitled to the illumination and guidance
this common-law process affords, and appellate courts depend on
it for the performance of their assigned task of review. As Judge
Friendly recognized [in Polaroid], the "problem of determining
how far a valid trademark should be protected... has long been
vexing and does not become easier of solution with the years."
The efficacy of the multifactor approach that Judge Friendly
wisely set out to address this difficult situation depends on
thorough, careful, and consistent application of the doctrine by
district courts. s6

While a "thorough, careful, and consistent application" of
multifactor tests of the sort exemplified by Polaroid may provide a
facade of consistency and thoroughness, any hope for fundamental
improvement in the essentially indeterminate nature of the tests for
likelihood of confusion must remain, in principle, in vain. As noted
previously, the creation of a coherent test for likelihood of confusion
must be grounded in a secure conceptual grasp of the human
experience of resemblance.
Because an investigation of the
conceptual landscape of the human ability to perceive resemblance
and related perceptual abilities reveals an irresolvably complex,
intricate, and puzzling topography, the attainment of a coherent
and/or transparent test for likelihood of confusion seems impossible.

156

KIRKPATRIcK,

supra note 7, at § 2.4 (citations omitted).

